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1Abstract
This paper derives a method to quantify the short- to medium-run impact of biofuel on fuel
markets, assuming that these markets are dominated by cartel of oil-rich countries, and that prices
in these countries are set to maximize the sum of domestic consumer and producer surplus, leading
to a wedge between domestic and international fuel prices. We model this behavior by applying
the optimal export tax model (henceforth, the cartel-of-nations model) to the fuel markets. Using
data from 2007 to calibrate the model, we show that the introduction of biofuels lowered global
gasoline and diesel consumption and international fuel prices by about 1% and 2%, respectively.
We identify large dierences between the eects of introducing biofuels using the cartel-of-nations
model, in contrast to the competitive or the standard cartel model (henceforth, the cartel-of-
rms model). We illustrate that assessing the eect of biofuels assuming competitive fuel markets
overestimates the reduction in fuel price, and underestimates the reduction of gasoline and diesel
consumption, and therefore impact of biofuels on greenhouse gas emissions, when compared to
the eect under a cartel-of-nations model. Similar conclusions are derived with respect to cartel-
of-rms model. Finally, we illustrate that a 20% increase in fuel demand more than doubles the
impact of biofuels on fuel markets, compared to 2007.
JEL code: F1, Q4
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21 Introduction
Concerns about energy security and high oil prices, as well as greenhouse gases, led to policies that pro-
moted the use of biofuels (e.g., the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 20091; The European
Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, 20062). Yet, the eects of the introduction
of biofuels on fuel markets are not fully understood. Recent studies on the eect of biofuels assume
competitive fuel markets (e.g., Rajagopal et al. 2007; de Gorter and Just 2008; Gardner 1987), thus
ignoring the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This paper introduces an al-
ternative framework to analyze how OPEC responds to growing biofuel use, which we use to estimate
the short- to medium-run eect of biofuel on the fuel markets. Specically, we discuss the short-run
eect of biofuel on fuel prices, quantity consumed, carbon emissions, and the distribution of costs and
benets from biofuel.
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that fuel prices in oil exporting nations are
lower than in oil importing nations, and the recognition that OPEC nations cooperate when making
oil production decisions. Therefore, we do not model OPEC as a cartel-of-rms (henceforth, COF),
which would not allow a wedge between prices among exporting and importing countries, but rather
as a cartel-of-nations (henceforth, CON). While building on the traditional optimal export tax model,
we model the CON model assuming that oil-exporting countries operate as one unit that maximize the
sum of domestic consumer and producer surplus from oil production and fuel consumption, resulting in
a wedge between prices in oil-exporting countries and oil-importing countries. This wedge equals the
optimal export tax. We also assume biofuel represents a competitive fringe, which aects oil-exporting
countries' decision making, and that oil-importing countries behave competitively.3
We begin by assuming CON and showing conceptually that OPEC responds to the introduction of
biofuels by reducing exports, but increasing domestic consumption, more than suggested by the COM
and COF models. Under the CON model, the domestic consumer benet from fuel consumption, in
addition to prots from fuel production, aects OPEC's production decisions. More specically, we
show that the impact of the introduction of biofuels on the amount of gasoline and diesel consumed is
largest under the COF model, but smallest under the COM model. On the other hand, although the
decline in prices in oil-importing countries due to biofuels is largest under COM, it is smallest under
CON not COF.
We then calibrate the model to 2007 data, and estimate that biofuel production in 2007 increased
fuel subsidies in OPEC countries by 2%-3%, and it reduced world fuel prices by 2%. On the other
1http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-2454
2http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/doc/2006 03 08 gp document en.pdf
3Although theoretically, large oil consuming countries can exercise their monopsony power and impact the interna-
tional price of crude oil (for example, by levying an import taris or quota), the reality is that in the short-run most
oil consuming countries have limited scope for adjusting oil supply or demand, particularly as oil demand becomes
increasingly concentrated in the transportation sector (IEA 2005) and that the demand for oil in the light duty vehicle
sector is becoming increasingly inelastic (Hughes et al. 2008). Having said that, Leiby (2007) calculates that the oil
import premium is $13.60 per barrel (in 2004 dollars), with a wide 90% condence interval ($6.70 - $23.25).
3hand, the introduction of biofuels caused the annual consumption of gasoline and diesel to decline by
about 1.2 billion gallons a year, i.e., about 1% of total consumption. We also compute total change
in carbon emissions due to the introduction of biofuels, using the average per unit carbon footprints
of dierent fuel feedstock. We show that with corn ethanol the CON model results in the smallest
increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and that the dierence between CON and COM are
large. We also show that there is a potential for GHG emission savings with the introduction of
second-generation of cellulosic biofuels.
Our analysis shows that the model used to characterize the energy market aects the estimates
of the eects of biofuels on consumption and production. For example, when compared to the CON
model, we show that competition overestimates the price eect, but underestimates both quantity and
environmental eects attributed to the introduction of biofuels (the environmental eect is underes-
timated by about 40%). The impact of biofuel on the oil economy is likely to increase in the future
as demand for fuel increases. Assuming fuel demand increases by 20%, we estimate that biofuel con-
sumption as well as its eect on prices will double, and thus the magnitude of the dierence between
CON and the COM or the COF models becomes even more signicant.
Section 2 below describes alternative frameworks used to model oil-exporting countries, and the
outcomes under the alternative models are compared in Section 3. The calibration is described in
Section 4, whereas the data used is presented in Section 5. The results of the numerical analysis is
presented in Section 6. Policy implications and concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
2 OPEC and biofuel: A conceptual framework
Our objective is to introduce biofuels into fuel markets, recognizing that these markets are dominated
by a cartel of oil-rich nations, and that there is a wedge between the price in oil-rich countries and in
oil-importing countries (Metschies et al., 2007).
The existing literature on biofuels, as well as literature on food versus fuel assumes a competitive
fuel market (e.g., Rajagopal et al. 2009; FAO 2008; Abbott et al. 2008). On the other hand, the
literature on crude oil usually assumes a COF model employing a static or a dynamic framework (e.g.,
Adelman 1982; Grin 1985; Lin 2007).4 The former literature ignores OPEC, whereas the latter
ignores the wedge between domestic and international prices. Unlike the above models, the CON
model does capture the wedge we observe in the data and does model OPEC's pricing behavior.5
With the CON model, the baseline model in this paper, governments in oil-exporting countries set
4A few have also argued that OPEC is a revenue-maximizing entity (e.g., Teece 1982); OPEC is driven mostly by
political motives (e.g., Moran 1982); and that OPEC core members behave as a dominant, prot-maximizing rm, while
other members respond to a dierent set of incentives (e.g., Alhajji and Huettner 2000).
5Hochman and Zilberman (2010) showed, using data on gasoline prices during the late 1990s to early 2000s, that
the CON model explains OPEC's behavior well.
4prices to maximize the sum of domestic consumer and producer surplus from fuel consumption and
production.
We employ a static partial equilibrium analysis to model the global fuel market, while considering
two countries: an oil-rich country (denoted country H, which can be interpreted as OPEC) and an oil-
importing country (denoted country F). Country F's variables are denoted with asterisk (*), country
H variables with no asterisk.
2.1 The international fuel market
Initially, we assume no biofuels. Country H produces Q units of fuel, with X units sold domestically
and M units sold abroad. The price of fuel in country H is p, whereas it is p in country F.6 MC
denotes the marginal cost of fuel production. While early papers found support for the Hotelling
Valuation Principle (e.g., Miller and Upton, 1985), recent papers did not nd such support (e.g.,
Adelman and Watkins, 1995) and showed using oil and gas transaction data that reserve asset values
are much smaller than the values predicted by the Hotelling theory and are considerably below net
wellhead prices. We, therefore, remain agnostic to dynamic facets of gasoline and diesel production and
do not distinguish between marginal and user costs.7 Furthermore, our partial equilibrium analysis
does not explicitly add the cost of pollution to the oil-exporting country's decision process, a country
that produces and consumes fuel extracted and produced from crude but not from biofuels. We do,
however, compute the change in GHG emissions due to the introduction of biofuels.
We present and contrast three alternative market structures: the COM, the COF, and the CON
models. Whereas the COM market structure suggests demand equals supply and the fuel price equals
marginal cost, under the COF model oil rms' maximize their joint prots. Policy in the CON model,
in contrast to the other two models, is set to maximize oil-exporting countries' consumer and producer
surplus from fuel production and consumption.
More specically, under a COM model p = p = MC. Given no-transaction costs and no market
power, the fuel price in H equals the price in F. Then, since rms are price takers, the price equals the
marginal cost of production. The equilibrium outcome is depicted in Fig. 1, where aggregate demand
for fuel is denoted D+D, such that the oil-exporting and oil-importing countries' demand functions
are D and D, respectively. Let S denote supply of gasoline and diesel, and the equilibrium point,
denoted A in Fig. 1, is obtained at quantity QCOM and price pCOM = p
COM.
6For simplicity and without loss of generality we assumed fossil fuel is produced only in country H. Alternatively,
we can assume country F imports oil, and derive country F's import demand curve, i.e., aggregate demand in country
F minus domestic production.
7Having said that, dynamic facets of gasoline and diesel, such as capital or interest costs, can be explicitly introduced
to the analysis as user costs, which measure the cost incurred over a period of time as a consequence of extracting crude
oil.
5Figure 1: The COM model
The COF model, on the other hand, assumes rms collude and form a cartel (see Fig. 2). Then,
in equilibrium MR = @ ((D + D)  p)=@Q = MC. In other words, marginal revenue equals marginal
cost and pCOF = p
COF > MC. When compared to the COM equilibrium, the COF equilibrium,
denoted point B in Fig. 2, yields a higher price to both domestic and foreign consumers. Although
this theory explains why fuel prices are higher than marginal cost, the COF model does not explain
the observed wedge between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries' fuel prices.
Figure 2: The COF model
Finally, the CON model assumes politicians in the exporting country design the export tax to
maximize the sum of its consumers' and producers' net welfare plus export tax revenues. The optimal
6Figure 3: Export tax
allocation rule is then derived, assuming rms are price takers and country H has monopoly power
in international markets (captured by points CQ, CH, and CF in Fig. 3). The left-hand part of
Fig. 3 depicts consumption, whereas the right-hand side depicts production. The marginal import
revenue curve, MR = @ (p  M)=@M, is added to the domestic demand curve, D, to yield the
kink curve D + MR
 1
. The intersection of this curve with the marginal cost curve, S, yields total
fuel output, QCON, which results in export and domestic consumption levels, XCON and MCON,
respectively. In this case, pCON denotes domestic price and the import price (world price) p
CON >
pCON. To implement this policy, the export tax should equal p
CON   pCON. Such a policy can also
be implemented with a quota, QCON, and a domestic consumption subsidy equal to p
CON   pCON.
Henceforth, and for simplicity, we focus on an optimal export tax.
As the CON model suggests, consumers of gasoline and diesel in oil-rich countries pay a signi-
cantly lower price at the pump, compared with the price paid by consumers in oil-importing countries
(Metschies et al. 2007). Whereas in 2006 super gasoline prices in non-OPEC countries equaled, on
average, 1.04 US$ per liter, it equaled only 0.28 US$ per liter in OPEC countries (Metschies et al.
2007). Moreover, nominal subsidies went up in OPEC countries, at times when crude oil prices surged
during 2002 to 2006 (Metschies et al. 2007). A similar pattern is observed for diesel prices, such that
diesel prices in non-OPEC countries equal 0.9 US$, but they only equal 0.26 US$ in OPEC countries.
72.2 Introducing biofuels into the international fuel market
We now introduce biofuels, denoted B, to fuel markets, such that global fuel consumption equals
Q + B. Biofuels are liquid substitutes to gasoline and diesel that are derived from grains, sugar, and
oil seeds.8 We assume oil and biofuel feedstock are used to produce fuel, which is measured in terms of
gasoline-equivalent energy units. Conceptually, normalizing fuel to a common denominator equalizes
fuel prices, independent of the feedstock used. This performs relatively well when we use annual 2007
fuel prices in the United States, in part because biofuel mandates in the United States did not bind
for most of 2007 and mandates do not exist in Brazil.9 Allowing the dierence between biofuels and
gasoline and diesel prices to vary does not alter the results qualitatively, although it does aect the
magnitude of the dierence between the price of fuel in oil-importing and oil-exporting countries.
About 50% of biofuel production costs come from the feedstock itself (National Renewable Energy
Laboratory website), which is purchased from multiple (farm) locations (for example, 72% of farms in
the U. S. plant less than 250 acres of corn per farm). The bio-renery uses the feedstock to produce
a spectrum of products (i.e., food, feed, materials, and chemicals) and energy (fuels, power, and
heat), and its scale of operation is much smaller than a petroleum renery. For instance, the average
capacity of a bio-renery in the United States is 47 million gasoline-equivalent gallons (GEG) per
year,10 whereas the capacity of the average oil renery in the United States is 871 million gasoline
gallons. In Brazil, on the other hand, there were 378 ethanol plants operating by July 2008, 126
dedicated to ethanol production and 252 producing both sugar and ethanol. We, therefore, assumed
the biofuel industry behaves competitively, and biofuel is produced by producers located in the country
F, i.e., the oil-importing country. OPEC has vast oil reserves, whereas the oil-importing countries
have access to biomass and the technology needed to convert it to biofuels. These assumptions capture
the structure of the global fuel markets, whereby on the one hand crude oil extraction is concentrated
in a region that does not produce biofuels, and on the other hand trade in biofuels is concentrated
among oil-importing countries.11
For simplicity, we focus on the eect of biofuel on world fuel markets assuming the CON model.
Fig. 4 depicts the fuel market, which now includes biofuels (the red curves). The supply of biofuels
reduces demand for gasoline and diesel to D
0
, such that D
0
= D
fuel B. The larger the international
price of fuel, the larger is the quantity supplied of biofuels and, therefore, the smaller is the quantity of
gasoline and diesel imported to country F. The gap between D
0
and D widens as the price increases.
8For a comprehensive survey on biofuels, their economic impacts, as well as their environmental implications, see
Rajagopal and Zilberman (2008).
9For more on the theoretical relation between ethanol and gasoline prices, in the absence of a mandate, see de Gorter
and Just (2008), Wallace and Taheripour (2008) and Hochman et al. (2010).
10The data were collected on July 14, 2009, from http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/locations/
11In reality, there is trade in biofuels, but it is concentrated among non-OPEC countries, which in our simple model
are treated as one group. In principle, however, the model may allow OPEC countries to import biofuel. Because
OPEC countries subsidize gasoline, it makes importing biofuel not protable. We, therefore, excluded this possibility
for simplicity and tractability from the numerical analysis.
8Figure 4: Introducing biofuels to the fuel markets




equals MC, where MR
0
= @ (p  Moil)=@Moil. Hence, price in country H declines, as does the price
in country F. Note that although fuel prices in country F, gasoline and diesel consumption in country
F, and total gasoline and diesel consumption go down, gasoline and diesel consumption in country H
goes up. With biofuel, country H, i.e., the oil-exporting country, consumes more gasoline and diesel,
as illustrated by the left-hand side of Fig. 4, i.e., p
0
< p and M0 < M whereas X0 > X. The
right-hand side of Fig. 4, on the other hand, illustrates that production of gasoline and diesel goes
down with biofuel, i.e., Q0 < Q.
3 Comparing outcomes under the alternative models
3.1 The international fuel markets
We begin by comparing the equilibrium outcomes under the CON, COF, and COM models, assuming
fuel can be produced only from crude oil.
Proposition 1 When demand and marginal costs are well-behaved (that is, when the demand curve
is a continuous downward sloping function and marginal cost curve is a continuous upward sloping
function),
91. Global production is largest under the COM model and smallest under the COF model, i.e.,
QCOF < QCON < QCOM.
2. Consumption in oil-importing countries is largest under the COM model and smallest under




3. On the other hand, consumption in oil-exporting countries is largest under the CON model and
smallest under the COF model, i.e., XCOF < XCOM < XCON (i.e., pCOF > pCOM > pCON).
Furthermore, pCOM = p
COM and pCOF = p
COF, whereas the wedge between world and domestic
prices in OPEC countries is p
CON   pCON.
Proof: The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Under the CON model, less supply is available for export resulting in higher prices and lower
quantities in oil-importing countries, compared to outcomes under the COM and COF models. But
with the CON model, large quantities are allocated to domestic consumption, and this increase in
domestic consumption in oil-exporting countries results in higher overall production compared to the
COF model.
3.2 The eect of the introduction of biofuels on the international fuel
market
Next, we compare equilibrium outcomes under the CON, COF, and COM models, and show how the
introduction of biofuels impacts world fuel markets under the alternative models.
Proposition 2 Assume demand is downward sloping and marginal cost is upward sloping. Then, the
impact of the introduction of biofuels on fuel markets depends on the model used:
1. global fuel production increases (fossil fuels plus biofuels), although global fossil fuel production







2. consumption of fossil fuel in oil-exporting countries increases such that the largest impact is
under the CON model, i.e., @DCON
@B > @DCOF
@B > @DCOM
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3. consumption of fossil fuel in oil-importing countries decreases such that the smallest impact is

























Proof: The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
10The introduction of biofuels causes consumers in oil-importing countries to substitute fossil fuel
with biofuels. It also causes oil-exporting countries (rms), with market power in international mar-
kets, to restrict fossil fuel production. Specically, the oil-exporting countries mitigate the decline
in prices in oil-importing countries by reducing fossil fuel exports above and beyond what the COM
model suggests. Furthermore, under the CON model domestic prices in oil-exporting countries decline
the most, because domestic consumer surplus, as well as prots, aect OPEC's production decisions.
The framework presented above, i.e., the CON model, captures an important stylized fact|that
there is a positive wedge between prices in oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, and that this
wedge increases with the introduction of biofuels. It suggests that the introduction of biofuels aects
the price of fuel, and the quantities and composition of fuels consumed, and that the magnitude of its
impact is inuenced by market structure. While theory can predict the qualitative eects of biofuel
on fuel markets, to derive policy recommendations, quantitative measures are also required. To this
end, we now resort to numerical analysis to quantify the eects of biofuel on fuel markets.
4 Calibrating the model
To illustrate numerically the welfare implications of the CON model versus the other models, when
biofuels are introduced to the fuel market, we develop an example that uses linear demand and
marginal cost curves. We denote the quantity of biofuels supplied and consumed in the oil-importing
country as Qbiofuel and Mbiofuel, respectively, and assume oil-exporting countries behave like a leading
rm, treating the biofuel industry as a competitive fringe that takes the international fuel price as
given. Subscript foilg denotes gasoline and diesel consumption, whereas subscript ffuelg denotes fuel
consumption (gasoline, diesel, and biofuels), either by OPEC countries (i.e., X) or by the oil-importing
country (i.e., M). In other words,
D : p = 0   1  Xoil;




1  Mfuel; and (1)
MC : MC = 0 + 1  Qoil;
and where Xoil + Mfuel = Qoil + Qbiofuel. Biofuels are produced and consumed only in the oil-
importing country, as observed in 2007. When calibrating the model, all quantities are adjusted to





For the calibration, we assumed short-run biofuel production is capacity constrained, but is up-
ward sloping in the long run. Specically, the quantity of biofuel supplied is assumed to be xed in
calibrating the model for 2007, but assume biofuel's supply is upward sloping in Section 6.3 when
analyzing the eect of biofuel with a 20% increase in demand for fuel.
11Authors modeling empirically the demand for fuels use the linear assumption (D ees et al., 2007;
Lin 2007; among others), and numerical simulations suggest that the results presented in the pa-
per do not change qualitatively if, instead, we assume constant demand elasticity. Furthermore, an
upward-sloping supply function better characterizes the fuel market, in contrast to a constant unit
cost function. Whereas the upstream costs for a barrel of oil equivalent in the United States for
onshore drilling equals 23.45 US$, it equals 57.20 US$ for oshore drilling. The marginal cost of a
barrel of crude oil increases with the quantity supplied { the rst barrel comes from onshore drilling,
the last from oshore (Energy Information Administration, 2008b).
We used observed data on quantities and prices, given assumptions on equilibrium behavior, to









Equation (2), together with the equilibrium quantity and prices M and p, are used to compute
the intercept of the demand function:


0 = p + 

1  M: (3)
We use equilibrium behavior to compute the price in country H, given the annual Western Texas
Intermediate price of crude oil. To this end, we know that
p = MR = 

0   2  

1  Moil = 2  p   

0 (4)
The rst equality in (4) follows from OPEC's equilibrium pricing behavior; the second follows the
denition of marginal revenue; the latter uses the fuel demand curve in country H to substitute for
Xfuel.
Building on demand equations computed above, we compute marginal cost given equilibrium




and 0 = Qoil   1  p: (5)
Note that each model implies dierent equilibrium behavior, and therefore dierent marginal cost
curves. Whereas in competition, we equate demand and supply, in the COF model we equate marginal





marginal cost. The demand curve for country H, but not country F, is also sensitive to the model
chosen. This also introduces further dierences between the CON model and the COF or the COM
models.
125 Data
Building on the assumptions made above, we calibrated the alternative models using data on crude oil
and biofuels in 2007 (see Table 1). Crude oil data on prices and quantities is taken from the British
Petroleum Statistical Review.12
We aim to explain dierences in fuel prices among oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, and
show how the introduction of biofuels and biodiesel aects these markets. However, we have global
data on oil production and consumption but not on gasoline and diesel consumption. We do, however,
know that although crude oil is used to produce several products ranging from gasoline and diesel to
asphalt and oil lubricants, in the United States from 1993 to 2008 65% to 67% of a barrel of crude
oil is allocated annually to the production of gasoline and diesel.13 These two products, characterized
by relatively high prot margins when compared to other crude products, are the main source of
income to downstream reneries. This creates strong incentives for reneries to maximize the amount
of gasoline and diesel produced from crude, an amount that is constrained by technology.14 We,
therefore, assume a xed proportion relationship between crude-oil and fossil fuel consumed, i.e., that
the quantities of fossil fuel consumed can be derived from the quantities of crude oil and that the
optimal quantity of fuel consumed determines the the quantity of crude-oil demanded.
Specically, a barrel of crude oil, on average, yields 19.5 gallons of gasoline and 8.5 gallons of diesel.
This represents 67% of a barrel of crude oil, with the remaining volume used to produce kerosene-type
jet fuel, liqueed renery gases, still gas, coke, asphalt and road oil, and petrochemical feedstock.15 We
use this ratio to convert barrels of crude oil to GEG. This ratio is also used to compute a conservative
estimate for the price of a gallon of fuel in oil-importing countries (Table 1). In addition, since we
focus on global quantities of GEG imported and consumed (while excluding domestic production in
oil-importing countries), the numerical analysis does not include domestic fuel policies in oil-importing
countries. Finally, we assume a gallon of ethanol is equivalent to 2/3 a gallon of gasoline, whereas a
gallon of biodiesel is equivalent to 1.04 gallons of gasoline.16 Prices and quantities are combined with
demand and supply elasticites to derive the demand and supply of fossil fuels.
To compute fuel's contributions to GHG emissions, we recognize that every fuel feedstock has its
own CO2 intensity. Given a biofuel feedstock, to compute total CO2 emissions we multiplied for each
feedstock the tons of CO2 equivalent per megajoule (MJ)17 times the feedstock energy density in MJ
times the quantity consumed in equilibrium.
12http://www.bp.com/
13http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet pnp pct dc nus pct m.htm
14The evolution of the petroleum renery industry is one where the main objective of technological innovations,
dating back to the 1940s, is to maximize the amount of gasoline and diesel produced from a barrel of crude oil. See, for
example, Leer (2008) and Jones and Pujado (2008).
15http://www.txoga.org/articles/308/1/WHAT-A-BARREL-OF-CRUDE-OIL-MAKES
16http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gasoline gallon equivalent
17To convert gallons of gasoline, ethanol, or biodiesel to megajoule we use the Lower Heating Value (LHV), which
are 32.0, 33.3, and 21.1, respectively. Alternatively, we can use Higher Heating Value, which includes condensation of
combustion products, and for biomass is 6% to 7% higher than the LHV. However, because there is no attempt to extract
energy from hot exhaust gases, LHV is more appropriate (see http://bioenergy.ornl.gov/papers/misc/energy conv.html).
13Table 1 summarizes the values and parameters used to calibrate the models. Note that the nu-
merical analysis presented below builds on data conned to crude oil, biofuels, and biodiesel, and
does not include alternative fuel sources such as heavy oil. Adding alternative fuel sources introduces
additional complexity, but does not qualitatively change the results.
6 The numerical analysis
Building on price and quantity data for 2007, we calibrate the COM, the COF, and the CON models,
assuming the baseline model is CON.
Key parameters in the numerical analysis are the demand and supply elasticities. The fuel demand
elasticities reported in the literature are very low (Kalymon, 1975; Cooper, 2003), where a given change
in prices results in a small change in quantities. However, the import demand elasticity observed by
OPEC countries is much larger, because more than 50% of global oil consumption is extracted in
non-OPEC countries and there are alternative substitutes to crude oil such as oilsands. We, therefore,
choose a residual import demand elasticity (the import demand elasticity observed by an exporting
country) of -1.25, -1.5, -1.75, and -2.0 and fuel supply elasticity of 0.10.18 The low supply elasticity
captures the fact that global oil production stagnated in the last several years (Hamilton, 2009).
6.1 The baseline model: CON
When the import demand elasticity is -1.25, biofuels cause fuel prices in the importing country to
decline by about 1.8% (Table 2).19 The introduction of biofuels causes the import demand curve to
shift down and to the left, leading fuel prices to decline (Proposition 2). The wedge, on the other
hand, increases by 2% to 2.5% (Table 2). The introduction of biofuels creates pressure to reduce
prices. Oil-exporting countries mitigate this loss in prots due to the introduction of biofuels by
redistributing benets from biofuel to domestic fuel consumers. It reduces exports, but increases
domestic consumption. This ability to inuence prices, however, declines as demand becomes more
elastic, wherever larger levels of biofuel yield more elastic demand functions.
Introducing ethanol and biodiesel to fuel markets reduce gasoline and diesel consumption by 1 to 1.4
billion GEG (Table 3). At the same time, the rebound eect resulting from lower fuel prices contributes
to a net increase in fuel consumption of 9.5 to 9.9 billion GEG. The reduction in gasoline and diesel
depends on the supply elasticity, such that a larger supply elasticity implies a larger reduction and thus
18Assuming import demand elastic less than 1 in absolute value results in a larger price eect, but it is not applicable
for the COF model.
19If, instead of focusing on the elastic portion of the import demand curve, we assume an elasticity of -0.75, the
decline in prices almost doubles. However, since it is not reasonable that a cartel will locate in this region (the marginal
revenue is negative), we elected not to focus on elasticities smaller than 1 in absolute value.
14a smaller rebound eect. However, independent of the elasticity, the introduction of biofuels osets
the reduction in gasoline and diesel consumption and replaces dirty fuel with clean fuel (Proposition
2).
Although total quantity of fuel consumed increases with the introduction of biofuel, less gaso-
line is consumed in equilibrium. Table 4 illustrates that second-generation biofuel feedstock (i.e.,
switchgrass) yield net carbon savings (consistent with assumptions made in assessments of impact of
biofuel mandates by the EPA's Notice of Proposed Rule Making for the Renewable Fuel Standard 2 {
RFS2),20 and assuming the cost of carbon is 30 US$. Otherwise, the rebound eect { where biofuels
lower the price of fuel and thus increase fuel consumption { is large and the introduction of biofuels
increase GHG emissions (see Table 4, where sugarcane represents an ecient rst-generation biofuel
feedstock). This rebound eect becomes larger as the elasticity of demand increases (Table 4).
Next, we compare the economic gains from biofuel. In this analysis we assume that corn ethanol
is protable at 1.49 US$ a gallon (consistent with assumptions made in assessments of impact of
biofuel mandates by the EPA's Notice of Proposed Rule Making for the RFS2). Assuming import
demand elasticity -1.25, the implied marginal cost in equilibrium is 0.34 US$,21 which should also
equal the domestic price in the oil-exporting country. This is consistent with the Energy Information
Administration 2008 report22 that the upstream cost of a barrel of crude oil in the Middle East was
14.85 US$ between 2005 and 2007, which equals 0.35 US$ per gallon of gasoline (14.85/42 = 0.35).
Our analysis also suggests that the introduction of biofuels reduced the amount paid by consumers in
country F for fuel imported from country H by 23.2 billion US$, for import demand elasticity -1.25.
The marginal revenue o the import demand curve equals marginal cost, which equals domestic
price in the oil-exporting countries. Thus, the shift in the energy composition toward biofuels not only
reduces total fossil fuel production, but also reduce domestic gasoline prices. To this end, nominal
subsidies went up in OPEC countries, at times when crude oil prices surged (2002-2006), investment
stagnated, and biofuel supply expanded. During 2006 Saudi Arabia reduced its own fuel prices by 30%
ocially out of benevolence to its own population (Metschies et al. 2007). Consumer surplus in oil-
exporting countries went up by about 2 billion US$. The shift in energy composition, however, costs
the oil sector in the oil-exporting countries about 23.2 billion US$ (Table 5), which is approximately
20% of the U.S. current-account decit in the fourth quarter of 2009 (i.e., $115.6 billion US$).
Biofuels provide the potential for increasing farm income and aiding economic development, be-
cause biofuels create additional demand for crop production and because developing countries are
thought to have a comparative advantage in energy crop production. During the recent biofuel boom,
20http://www.epa.gov/OMSWWW/renewablefuels/rfs2-nprm-preamble-regs.pdf
21Although the empirical literature suggests inelastic global demand for crude oil, the elasticity of the residual demand
curve faced by a single exporting country should be higher. Similar elasticities were used in Hamilton (2008), when
evaluating Saudi Arabia's pricing behavior.
22http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet pri wco k w.htm
15farm income in the United States is estimated at a record $89.2 billion in 2008, up slightly from
the record setting $88.7 billion in 2007 and up roughly 50% from its 10-year average. Average farm
household income is estimated at $89,434, nearly 20% above the ve-year average from 2001-2006
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2008). In parallel to the spike in farm income, biofuel production
and protability spiked in 2007. The introduction of biofuels in oil importing countries increased
consumer surplus from fuel consumption by 10.6 billion US$ and added 2.5 billion US$ to biofuel
producers (Table 5).
Lowering the marginal cost of biofuel production increases the benets from biofuel to the import-
ing country. We compared the welfare gain from biofuel using the RFS2 estimates with an extreme
scenario, where biofuels are costless. For import demand elasticity of -1.25, when biofuel is costless,
its introduction increases global welfare by 2%, whereas welfare in the importing country increases
by 12%. This simple example illustrates the cost of a mandate, which forces inecient production of
biofuels (1.49 US$ for corn-ethanol versus about 0.3 US$ for gasoline and diesel), and complements
work done by de Gorter and Just (2008 and 2009) that focused on the implications of the U. S. biofuel
policy.
6.2 Comparing outcomes: CON versus COM and COF
We show that the distribution of resources among groups and nations, as well as carbon emitted from
energy consumption, are substantially dierent among various market structures. Selection of the
wrong model may lead to (big) measurement errors.
The COM model overestimates the price eect of biofuel on prices in country F by 9% to 26%,
when compared to the CON model { see Table 2 (and Proposition 2). The COF overestimates the
price eect by 4% to 17%. On the other hand, the COM model underestimates the eect of biofuels
on gasoline and diesel consumption by about 40% (Table 3), whereas the COF model overestimates
the eect by about 10%.
With CON, domestic consumption in oil-exporting countries matters. Whereas with COM or COF,
consumption in exporting countries increased by less than 220 million GEGs due to the introduction
of biofuel, it increased by more than 500 million gallons with CON. Oil-exporting countries increase
consumption of fuels. These considerations are overlooked when COF or COM behavior is assumed,
and the bias introduced becomes more signicant as GDP per capita in oil-exporting countries increase
(e.g., car ownership increases exponentially with GDP per capita once countries pass the 5,000 US$
mark). Although consumption of crude oil in the Middle East, Algeria, and Venezuela together
currently amounts to 10% of total world consumption of crude oil, consumption grew from 2005 to
2006 by 3.5%, 3.4%, and 4.3%, respectively. In contrast, consumption in the rest of the world grew
by an insignicant 0.7%.
16Next, the impact of biofuels on GHG emissions under the three models is compared. Dierence
in gasoline and diesel consumption between the three models has implications for carbon emissions
(Table 4). The rebound eect is largest under COM, but smallest under COF (Table 3). The COM
model underestimates by more than 37% the impact of biofuels on carbon emission, because the COM
model underestimates the reduction in gasoline and diesel consumption. The largest carbon savings
is reported using switchgrass, and employing the COF model (Table 4). The CON model is similar
to the COF model, although quantities of gasoline and diesel consumed are marginally larger. The
rebound eect increases, under all models, with the import demand elasticity, and decreases with the
supply elasticity.
Consumers gain from biofuel. Although the COM model overestimates consumers benet from
biofuel in importing country (country F), it underestimates the benets to consumers in the exporting
country (country H) { see table 5. The COM and COF models underestimate the costs of biofuel to
oil-exporting countries due to reduction in domestic fuel prices. The COM model underestimates the
cost to oil-exporting countries by 10.5% (Table 5). The COF model underestimates the cost by 1%.
The COM model overestimates total monetary benet from biofuel to the oil-importing country by
20.5%, whereas the COF model overestimates the benet from biofuel to the oil-importing country
by 13%.
6.3 Increasing demand for fuel augments the eect of biofuel on the fuel
markets
If history is indicative to the future of fuel markets, then demand for energy, especially fuel, will grow
substantially in the coming decades. Total world demand for crude oil increased by more than 18%
in the last 10 years (BP statistical review 2008). During September 2008, the EIA baseline scenario
(International Energy Outlook 2008) predicted that world marketed energy consumption will grow by
50% between 2005 and 2030. In their report, the EIA concluded that global energy demand would
continue to grow, despite sustained high world oil prices. Although high oil prices will probably induce
further innovations resulting in more energy eciency and slower growth in energy demand, all reports
we are aware of predict 20% growth in global oil consumption in the coming decades. Furthermore,
although during 2008 the credit crisis hampered growth in energy demand, many predict that demand
will rebound once the crisis subsides. Weekly export weighted F.O.B. prices for crude oil imported
from OPEC countries to the U.S. rebounded in 4 months by more than 55%; on January 2, 2009,
the F.O.B. price was 35.48 US$, whereas the price were 55.71 US$ on May 15, 2009. On April 2010,
international crude oil prices already hover around 80 US$ (EIA 2010).
We, therefore, considered the case where the importing country's demand for fuel increased by
20%; which is about the growth in global demand for crude oil from 1998 to 2008. We also assumed
17the oil-exporting country sees an import demand elasticity of -1.25 (for simplicity and tractability,
and given the above analysis, we present only one import demand elasticity in this section).
When it comes to the supply of biofuels, we assume short term supply elasticity of 2.5 following
Holland et al. (2009), and introduce continuous growth in the productivity of biofuels, in part due
to the introduction of second-generation biofuels. Results of variety of studies reported in Alstone et
al. (2009) suggest that assuming agricultural productivity growth between 1.5-3% is consistent with
historical patterns (although trends in agricultural productivity depend on the period region and crop
investigated). The results reported below are for a 2% growth rate in agriculture productivity. We
also assumed for the simulation that biofuel is protable at a price above 1.7143 US$. To mimic the
impact of biofuels on the fuel market, while assuming a higher break-even price or lower biofuel supply
elasticity, annual productivity growth in biofuel needs to be larger.
Under these assumptions, we show that with an increase in demand for fuels, the eect of biofuels
on fuel markets becomes much more substantial in absolute terms. Assuming the increase in fuel
consumption comes only from gasoline and diesel implies fuel prices in oil-importing countries increase
by 30.5%, whereas gasoline and diesel consumption increases by 2.8% globally, but by 5.7% in oil
importing countries.
The introduction of biofuels reduce prices in oil-importing countries by 2%, but reduce prices in oil-
exporting countries by 8%. Moreover, biofuel decreases global consumption of gasoline and diesel by
0.4%, but it increases total fuel consumption (gasoline, diesel, and biofuel consumption) by 2.2%|the
rebound eect. On the other hand, the sum of surplus to consumers from fuel consumption and prots
from biofuel production increases by more than 12%. The impact on GHG emissions is also larger.
To this end, the gains from reducing carbon are about 10 billion US$,23 if (i) biofuels are produced
using switchgrass (a second generation feedstock which, according to the RFS2, has negative direct
CO2 emissions|see Table 1), and (ii) the cost of a ton of carbon is 30 US$. The potential benets
from biofuel over time are enormous; the challenge, however, is to produce such large quantities of
biofuel in a sustainable, environmental, and economic way.24
Finally, if we use a COM model, then the introduction of biofuels reduces gasoline and diesel
consumption by only 10.29 billion gallons|44% less than the reduction of gasoline and diesel con-
sumption implied by the CON model. Moreover, the COM model suggests prices decline by 17.12%,
in contrast to the 2% suggested above when the CON model was used.
7 Policy implications and concluding remarks
In this paper, we assume oil-rich countries pursue cheap oil policies, which derive a wedge between
domestic and foreign prices by restricting the supply of oil in oil-importing countries. We contrast
23See Section 3 and Table 1 for the equation used to compute this value.
24For more on sustainability of biofuels, see Khanna et al. (2008).
18the ndings derived assuming a CON model with those derived when a COM or COF model is used,
and we illustrated large quantitative, as well as qualitative, dierences among the alternative models.
The introduction of biofuels aects fuel prices and quantities, distribution of economic surplus, and
climate change. Failure to incorporate OPEC into the analysis will result in poor impact assessment.
In our empirical analysis, we illustrated that COM overestimates the price eect and underes-
timates the quantity eect due to the introduction of biofuels. Large dierences in the amount of
gasoline and diesel consumed under the alternative models translate to large dierences in GHG emis-
sions. Assuming a ton of carbon is 30 US$, the COM model underestimate the impact of biofuels
on carbon emissions by about 40% when compared to CON. Although these dierences depend on
the elasticity, especially the elasticity of crude-oil supply, the dierences remain large under plausible
scenarios (recall that introducing biofuels causes gasoline and diesel quantities to decline more under
the CON model, when compared to COM). Conceptually, OPEC responds to the introduction of bio-
fuels by reducing exports and increasing domestic consumption, resulting in a decline in total gasoline
and diesel consumption above and beyond the decline suggested by the COM model. Then, if the
GHG emissions of biofuel are signicantly lower than the emissions attributed to gasoline and diesel
consumption, the introduction of biofuels results in net GHG savings.
In addition, the eect of biofuel on consumers of gasoline and diesel, and the distribution of benets
across dierent consumer groups, is dierent from the benets derived using the COM or the COF
model. In contrast to the COM model, consumers in importing countries gain less because OPEC
uses its market power to shift the gains from biofuel to its domestic consumers. Here, we nd that
fuel consumers beneted from the introduction of biofuel. Choosing the right policy is crucial for
developing an economically and environmentally sustainable biofuel industry, and thus picking the
right market structure is fundamental for any policy analysis.
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218 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Assume @D
@p < 0, @D

@p < 0, and @MC
@Q > 0. Using the equilibrium conditions under COM, COF, and
CON, namely
COM : (D + D)
 1 = MC (QCOM) = pCOM = p
COM
COF : ~ MR = MC (QCOF) < pCOF = p
COF
CON : ~ D 1 = MC (QCON) = pCON < p
CON;




and ~ D  D + MR
 1
, we can show that QCOF < QCON <
QCOM. The reason is that D 1 = p > MR = p + D  @p=@D because @p=@D < 0. Similarly,
we can show that D
 1





. It then follows that QCOF < QCON < QCOM because supply is upward sloping,
i.e., @MC
@Q > 0. Furthermore, QCON < QCOM suggests that pCON < pCOM (because @MC
@Q > 0), which
implies that XCON > XCOM and thus MCON < MCOM (because Q = M + X). Finally, because
MC (QCON) = MR (MCON) > MC (QCOF) = MR (MCOF) and @D






Proof of Proposition 2
Assume @D
@p < 0, @D

@p < 0, and @MC
@Q > 0. Also, let superscript f'g denote net fossil fuel, i.e., total






COF : ~ MR = MC (QCOF)
CON : ~ D 1 = MC (QCON);
where
COM : MC (QCOM) = pCOM = p
COM
COF : MC (QCOF) < pCOF = p
COF
CON : MC (QCON) = pCON < p
CON;















are function of both D and B). Then, using the equilibrium conditions
22while applying the implicit function theorem, assuming the biofuel mandate binds, and that
Q = D + D
0





@p=@ (D + D)





@ ~ MR=@ (D + D)





@ ~ D 1=@ (D + D)
@ ~ D 1=@ (D + D)   @MC=@Q
;
These derivatives show the impact of the introduction of biofuels on the equilibrium quantity of
gasoline and diesel produced and consumed. Then, because,
0 >
@p
@ (D + D)
>
@ ~ D 1
@ (D + D)
>
@ ~ MR













If, on the other hand, the mandate is not binding and the biofuel supply curve is upward sloping,
then the impact of the introduction of biofuels on gasoline and diesel consumption is smaller,
although the signs are never reversed. Furthermore, under CON, p   MC = 0, and thus total













(recall that D(p) and MC (Q)). Put dierently, and since dQCON=dB < 0, D increases with the
introduction of biofuels. This also implies that D
0
decreases with the introduction of biofuels.
Although total fuel consumption D + D increases with the introduction of biofuels, gasoline and
diesel production and consumption, i.e., Q and D + D
0
, decline. Therefore, because the total











23Table 1. The model parameters 
  Value 
2007 quantity and price data   
Quantity of gasoline consumed by country H  6.2 million barrels a day 
Quantity of gasoline consumed by country F  54.8 million barrels a day 
Price of a barrel of crude oil  72 US$ 
Price of gasoline  1.7143 US$ 
Global quantity of ethanol consumed  13.5 billion GEG a year 
Global quantity of biodiesel consumed  6.16 million tones a year 
Parameters used to compute CO2 emissions   
Ethanol energy density in MJ per liter  21.1 
Biodiesel energy density in MJ per liter (vegetable oil)  33.3 
Gasoline energy density in MJ per liter  32.0 
Gram of CO2 equivalent per MJ of gasoline  95.6 
Gram of CO2 equivalent per MJ of sugarcane  50 
Gram of CO2 equivalent per MJ of corn stover
*  -15 
Gram of CO2 equivalent per MJ of switchgrass
*  -23 
* Source: RFS2 
	 ﾠ
Table 1: The model parameters
24Table 2. The price effect of biofuel in US$ 
     -1.25  -1.5  -1.75  -2 
              
Competition  -0.0444  -0.0376  -0.0326  -0.0288 
Cartel  -0.0412  -0.0353  -0.0308  -0.0274 
CON             
Exporting country  -0.0707  -0.0654  -0.0587  -0.0529 
Importing country  -0.0354  -0.0327  -0.0294  -0.0264 
Levels: US$ 
Wedge  0.0354  0.0327  0.0294  0.0264 
              
Competition  -2.52%  -2.15%  -1.87%  -1.65% 
Cartel  -2.35%  -2.02%  -1.77%  -1.57% 
CON             
Exporting country  -17.10%  -10.27%  -7.40%  -5.81% 
Importing country  -2.02%  -1.87%  -1.68%  -1.52% 
Percent 
Wedge  2.65%  2.95%  3.09%  3.18% 
              
Competition  25.48%  14.91%  11.00%  8.86% 





              
 
Table 2: The price eect of biofuel in US$
25Table 3. Fuel consumption and biofuel (million of gallons) 
    
Demand 
elasticity  -1.25  -1.5  -1.75  -2 
                 
Competition                
 
Exporting 
country  215.23  182.31  158.13  139.61 
  
Importing 
country  -1,062.30  -899.80  -780.44  -689.04 
   Total  -847.04  -717.49  -622.31  -549.43 
Cartel                
 
Exporting 
country  199.75  171.08  149.61  132.93 
  
Importing 
country  -1,772.00  -1,517.60  -1,327.20  -1,179.20 
   Total  -1,572.20  -1,346.60  -1,177.60  -1,046.20 
CON                
 
Exporting 
country  1,715.30  951.96  664.80  512.98 
  
Importing 
country  -3,065.40  -2,200.80  -1,786.10  -1,522.40 
   Total  -1,350.10  -1,248.80  -1,121.30  -1,009.40 
Levels 
Biofuel     10,927.90  10,927.20  10,927.20  10,927.80 
                 




CON  Cartel     16.45%  7.83%  5.02%  3.65% 
                 
Competition     10,080.86  10,209.71  10,304.89  10,378.37 




CON     9,577.80  9,678.40  9,805.90  9,918.40 
 
Table 3: Fuel consumption and biofuel: Million of gallons
26Table 4. GHG emissions 
Reduction in the cost of carbon - millions of US$ (assuming 30 US$ per ton of carbon) 
                 
Feedstock     -1.25  -1.5  -1.75  -2 
Sugarcane                
   Competition  $1,045.80   $1,094.20   $1,129.76   $1,156.99  
   Cartel  $774.87   $859.17   $922.32   $971.37  
   CON  $857.85   $895.68   $943.35   $985.14  
Advance biofuel - low                
   Competition  $422.13   $470.53   $506.09   $533.32  
   Cartel  $151.20   $235.50   $298.65   $347.70  
   CON  $234.18   $272.01   $319.68   $361.47  
Switchgrass                
   Competition  ($987.21)  ($938.81)  ($903.25)  ($876.02) 
   Cartel  ($1,258.14)  ($1,173.84)  ($1,110.69)  ($1,061.64) 
   CON  ($1,175.16)  ($1,137.33)  ($1,089.66)  ($1,047.87) 
                 
Reduction in carbon units -- million of tons 
Sugarcane                
   Competition  34.86  36.47  37.66  38.57 
   Cartel  25.83  28.64  30.74  32.38 
   CON  28.60  29.86  31.45  32.84 
Advance biofuel - low                
   Competition  14.07  15.68  16.87  17.78 
   Cartel  5.04  7.85  9.96  11.59 
   CON  7.81  9.07  10.66  12.05 
Switchgrass                
   Competition  -32.91  -31.29  -30.11  -29.20 
   Cartel  -41.94  -39.13  -37.02  -35.39 
   CON  -39.17  -37.91  -36.32  -34.93 
	 ﾠ
Table 4: The cost of carbon
27Table 5. Disaggregating the benefits from biofuel 
Changes in economic surplus - millions of USD 
Change in:  Demand elasticity  -1.25 
Competition  13,311.00 
Cartel  12,368.00 
Consumer surplus: Importing 
country 
CON  10,643.00 
Competition  1,471.10 
Cartel  1,365.60 
Consumer surplus: Exporting 
country 
CON  2,291.70 
Competition  14,782.00 
Cartel  13,733.00 
Total change in consumer 
surplus 
CON  12,935.00 
Competition  2,450.90 
Cartel  2,450.90 
PS from biofuel production 
CON  2,450.90 
Competition  -14,539.00 
Cartel  -15,816.00 
Producer surplus: Exporting 
country 
CON  -23,192.00 
Competition  -12,089.00 
Cartel  -13,365.00 
Total change in producer 
surplus 
CON  -20,741.00 
   6,300.50  Export tax revenues 
Producer surplus plus 
revenues  -16,891.50 
     
Competition  15,761.9 
Cartel  14,818.9 
Total gain to importing country 
CON  13,093.9 
     
Competition  -13,067.90 
Cartel  -14,450.40 
Total gain to exporting country 
CON  -14,599.80 
	 ﾠ
Table 5: Disaggregating the benets from biofuel
28